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Covert communication allows us to transmit messages in such a way that it is not possible to detect
that the communication is occurring. This provides protection in situations where knowledge that
people are talking to each other may be incriminating to them. In this work, we study how covert
communication can be used for a different purpose: secret key expansion. First, we show that any
message transmitted in a secure covert protocol is also secret and therefore unknown to an adversary.
We then propose a protocol that uses covert communication where the amount of key consumed in
the protocol is smaller than the transmitted key, thus leading to secure secret key expansion. We
derive precise conditions showing that secret key expansion from covert communication is possible
when there are sufficiently low levels of noise for a given security level. We conclude by examining
how secret key expansion from covert communication can be performed in a computational security
model.
Quantum cryptography encompasses a wide range of
protocols that employ principles of quantum mechan-
ics to secure communication. Quantum key distribution
(QKD) is a method for key expansion where two par-
ties with access to an insecure quantum channel and a
small shared secret key can securely generate a much
larger shared secret key. This new secret key can then
be used be used to encrypt communications or to gen-
erate more secret key [1, 2]. Besides QKD, there are
many other protocols in quantum cryptography that are
beginning to shift from theoretical proposals to experi-
mental demonstrations. Examples of these are quantum
signature schemes [3–8], quantum fingerprinting [9–11],
bit commitment [12–15], and quantum money [16–22].
Covert communication offers a method to transmit
messages while hiding the fact that the communication is
happening at all. This allows users to prevent adversaries
from detecting their transmissions, providing a method
to secure their messages even in cases where revealing
that they are talking to each other may be incriminating
to them. Recently, a square-root law for covert com-
munication has been proven, stating that O(
√
N) covert
bits can be reliably sent over N channel uses, even in
the presence of an unbounded quantum adversary[23–
33]. Quantum communication protocols can also be car-
ried out covertly, either through noisy channels as in the
classical case [34] or by exploiting relativistic quantum
effects [35, 36].
In this work, we study how the techniques of covert
communication can be employed to achieve secure secret
key expansion. We show that the security statement of
covert communication is formally equivalent to compos-
able security for the secrecy of the transmitted messages.
This implies that all information sent in a secure covert
communication protocol is unknown to an eavesdropper
and can therefore be used as a secret key. Covert com-
munication protocols require an initial shared secret key
between the participants, which raises the question of
whether more secret key can be obtained than is con-
sumed. We describe a covert communication protocol
that is capable of generating more secret key than is con-
sumed, thus constituting a method for secure and covert
secret key expansion. We conclude by discussing how se-
crecy can be achieved and quantified in a computational
model where pseudorandomness is employed, which is
likely to be necessary for practical realizations of covert
communication.
I. SECRECY FROM COVERT
COMMUNICATION
Alice wants to transmit a message to Bob in such a way
that an eavesdropper Eve cannot distinguish whether
they are communicating or not. To quantify Eve’s abil-
ity to detect the communication, we assume that Alice
either communicates or not with equal probability and
Eve’s goal is to correctly distinguish between these two
scenarios. Eve’s detection error probability Pe is given
by Pe =
1
2 (PFA + PMD), where PFA is the probability
of a false alarm and PMD is the probability of a missed
detection. The goal of a secure protocol is to prevent Eve
from performing better than a random guess, i.e. it must
be that Pe ≥ 12 −  for sufficiently small  > 0. We refer
to  as the detection bias.
Covert communication requires noise in the channel
connecting Alice and Bob, who have access to N opti-
cal modes that can be used by Alice to transmit signals
to Bob. Eve has access to these modes once they leave
Alice’s lab and can perform any operation on them to at-
tempt to detect the communication. In all known covert
communication protocols, Alice and Bob achieve covert-
ness by using a shared secret key to randomly spread
their signals among theN available modes, allowing them
to “hide” their transmissions in the channel’s noise.
We can formally define the security of a covert com-
munication protocol in terms of a state discrimination
problem. When Alice and Bob are not talking to each
other, Eve receives a state ρ which depends on the prop-
erties of the noise. When they do communicate, Eve gets
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2a state σ that depends on both the noise and the signals
sent by Alice. The protocol is secure if Eve cannot dis-
tinguish these two states. From Helmstrom’s bound [37],
we can relate the detection bias  to the trace distance
between ρ and σ as
1
2
||ρ− σ||1 = 2. (1)
A covert communication protocol is -secure if this rela-
tion holds for any message sent by Alice to Bob.
In quantum key distribution (QKD), security of a se-
cret key generated from a QKD protocol is also quanti-
fied in terms of the trace distance between two states: the
shared state ρKE between Alice, Bob and Eve after car-
rying out the protocol, and the ideal state ρU⊗ρE , where
the quantum state ρU describes a uniformly distributed
key that is completely decoupled from Eve’s state ρE .
More precisely, the key generated by a QKD protocol is
called ε-secure if
1
2
||ρU ⊗ ρE − ρKE ||1 ≤ ε. (2)
This definition is composable, meaning that such a secret
key can be used as an input to other protocols without
compromising their security.
To connect this definition to the security of covert com-
munication, we include reference to an additional quan-
tum system held by Alice corresponding to her choice of
message. In that case, from Eve’s perspective, the state
when no covert communication takes place is given by
ρ′ =
∑
m
p(m)|m〉〈m| ⊗ ρ, (3)
where m denotes the possible messages, p(m) is the prob-
ability that it is selected for transmission and ρ is the
noisy state as before. Here, for convenience, we imag-
ine that Alice has selected a message m with probability
p(m) but simply does not transmit it. The state ρ′ is thus
an ideal state for secrecy of the message since Eve is com-
pletely uncorrelated from message register, and would be
so for any choice of state in Alice’s register other than∑
m p(m)|m〉〈m|, so we do not lose generality by making
this choice. Similarly, when Alice communicates with
Bob, the total state is given by
σ′ =
∑
m
p(m)|m〉〈m| ⊗ σm, (4)
where σm is the state of the modes when message m is
sent. If the covert communication protocol is -secure,
by definition it holds that
1
2
||ρ− σm|| = 2 (5)
for all m. We then have that
||ρ′ − σ′||1 = ||
∑
m
p(m)|m〉〈m| ⊗ (ρ− σm)||1
≤
∑
m
p(m)|||m〉〈m| ⊗ (ρ−⊗σm)||1
=
∑
m
p(m)||ρ− σm||1
≤
∑
m
p(m)4 = 4,
where we have used convexity of the trace norm. There-
fore, for any -secure covert communication protocol it
holds that
1
2
||ρ′ − σ′|| ≤ 2. (6)
We can conclude that if a covert communication proto-
col is -secure, then the transmitted message is 2-secure
with respect to its secrecy. This holds even when the
message is covertly transmitted as plaintext, i.e. without
any form of encryption, meaning that a secret key can
be distributed using a covert communication protocol by
sending a uniformly random string as the message. How-
ever, as discussed before, all known covert communica-
tion protocols require a shared secret key between Alice
and Bob. To achieve key expansion, a covert communi-
cation protocol must therefore transmit more secret key
than it consumes. In the following, we give an explicit
example of such a key expansion protocol.
II. KEY EXPANSION PROTOCOL
Alice and Bob have N = MD modes at their disposal,
which they divide into M blocks of D modes each. Their
goal is to covertly transmit a uniformly random string
that is longer than the secret key they require to carry
out the protocol. To do so, they first use their secret
key to select one of the M blocks uniformly at random,
which requires a key of logM bits. Here and throughout
the paper, all logarithms are in base 2. Once the block
is selected, they transmit a random string of logD bits
by selecting one of the D modes uniformly at random
and sending a single-photon signal in it. From Eve’s per-
spective, this strategy is equivalent to sending a signal
uniformly at random in one of the N available modes.
Let ρn be Eve’s state for a single mode when there is
only noise present and let ρs be the state of a single
mode when a single photon is sent. When there is no
communication, Eve’s state is tensor product state given
by
ρ = ρ⊗Nn . (7)
On the other hand, when Alice and Bob do communicate,
Eve’s state is given by
σ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Πi(ρs ⊗ ρ⊗N−1n ), (8)
3FIG. 1: (Color online) Covert communication protocol for se-
cret key expansion. Alice and Bob have N = MD modes
at their disposal, which they divide into M blocks of D
modes each. They randomly select one of the blocks and they
send one signal chosen uniformly at random among all the D
modes, allowing them to retrieve logD bits of key in an ideal
case. To do so, they require logM bits of pre-shared secret
key, so the protocol generates more key than it consumes as
long as D > M . In practice, we must also account for the cost
of error-correction, leading to more sophisticated conditions
for key expnasion.
where Πi is a permutation that places the signal state ρs
in the i-th mode. The detection bias can be calculated
in terms of the trace distance between these two states,
which is challenging to calculate given that σ is not a
tensor product state. Instead, we want to relate the de-
tection bias  of this protocol to the detection bias I of
an i.i.d. protocol where Alice chooses whether to send a
signal in each mode with equal probability. These proto-
cols have been carefully studied in the literature [33, 34]
and closed forms exist for their detection biases.
In the i.i.d. protocol, let pk be the probability that Al-
ice sends k signals. Conditioned on her sending k signals,
there is a resulting detection bias k for Eve which can
be used to express the actual detection bias I as
I =
N∑
k=0
pkk. (9)
Now, by definition 0 = 0, and 1 =  since exactly one
signal chosen uniformly at random among all modes is
sent in the original protocol. Assume, for the purpose of
contradiction, that 1 >
I
1−p0 . Since k+1 > k for all k,
it holds that
N∑
k=0
pkk =
N∑
k=1
pkk
>
N∑
k=1
pk
(
I
1− p0
)
= I ,
which is in contradiction with (9). Therefore, we con-
clude that
 ≤ I
1− p0 . (10)
This expression allows us to relate the detection bias of
the key expansion protocol to known detection biases of
protocols previously studied in the literature. Note that
in general both I and p0 depend on the protocol being
considered. For i.i.d. protocols, a square-root law has
been proven for the detection bias as a function of the
total number of time-bins [33, 34] stating that
I ≤ β√
N
(11)
for some constant β that depends on the protocol and
its parameters. This can be used to bound the detection
bias of the original protocol as
 ≤ β
(1− p0)
√
N
. (12)
The remaining challenge is to determine the conditions
for which more secret key can be transmitted than what
is consumed.
For a given , we can use Eq. (12) to calculate the
smallest N = MD that achieves the desired bound. This
fixes the number of blocks to be
M =
(
β
(1− p0)
)2
1
D
. (13)
We require logM secret bits to specify which block was
chosen. For the protocol to transmit more secret bits
than it consumes we need to have D > M , which leads
to the condition
D >
β
(1− p0) . (14)
From this it is clear that we want to make D as large
as possible. However, there is a limit which arises from
the reliability of decoding the message. In the presence
of noise, there is a probability pc of observing at least
one photon in any mode due to the noise present. If
Bob observes a click in a mode different than the one
where the signal was sent, he will obtain an error. The
probability δ of obtaining at least one click in one of the
other D − 1 modes is
δ(D) = 1− (1− pc)D−1. (15)
We can model the effect of error due to noise in the chan-
nel as a symmetric channel for D symbols that either
transmits the correct symbol with probability 1 − δ or
changes it to another one of the D − 1 remaining ones
with probability δ. The capacity of this channel, which
quantifies the number of bits that can be reliably trans-
mitted per use of the channel, is given by [38]
C = logD − h[δ(D)]− δ(D) log(D − 1), (16)
4where h(p) = −p log(p)− (1− p) log(1− p) is the binary
Shannon entropy. From this it is clear that we require
δ(D) to be small in order to achieve reliability of the
transmission. From Eq. (15), this implies the condition
Dpc  1, which sets a limit to the size of D. Overall,
more secret key will be produced than consumed as long
as C > logM . Combining Eqs. (14) and (16) while using
the approximations log(D − 1) ≈ logD we arrive at the
key expansion condition
[2− δ(D)] logD > 2 log
(
β
(1− p0)
)
+ h[δ(D)]. (17)
Whether there exists a value of D for which this condi-
tion can be met depends ultimately on the noise level –
which fixes the parameters β and pc – and on the target
detection bias . The i.i.d. protocol that is used to bound
the detection bias can be optimized to fix the value of p0
and β for a given noise level. In the following, we dis-
cuss an explicit family of protocols that can meet this
condition for key expansion.
We focus on protocols that use a single-photon signal
to transmit information and where noise originates from
background thermal radiation with mean photon number
per mode n¯. As shown in Ref. [34], for n¯  1, the
detection bias of an i.i.d. protocol can be bounded as
I ≤ d
4
1√
2Nn¯
, (18)
where d = qN is the average number of signals sent in
the i.i.d. protocol. Note that we have that
β =
d
4
√
2n¯
(19)
in this case. The probability of not sending any signals
in the i.i.d. protocol is
p0 = (1− q)N
=
(
1− d
N
)N
≈ e−d,
where the last approximation holds in the limit of N 
1. Finally, the probability pc of observing at least one
photon in each of the noisy modes is given by
pc = 1− 1
1 + n¯
≈ n¯ (20)
which leads to a value of
δ(D) = 1−
(
1
1 + n¯
)D−1
, (21)
for the error probability. Plugging in these expressions
we obtain the key expansion condition
[2− δ(D)] logD > 2 log
(
d
4
√
2n¯(1− e−d)
)
+ h[δ(D)].
(22)
For given values of n¯ and , it suffices to fix a value of
d for the i.i.d. protocol and determine whether there
exist values of D such that this inequality is satisfied.
However, we can significantly simplify the condition by
using a series of approximations.
First, we fix the value of d such that d/(4
√
2(1 −
e−d)) = 1. Similarly, we consider only values of D such
that Dn¯  1 and we ignore any term that is linear in
Dn¯. This leads to a simplified key expansion condition
2 logD > log
(
1
n¯2
)
. (23)
From this, together with the condition Dn¯ 1, it is easy
to see that the key expansion condition can be achieved
as long as 1/2 is small compared to 1/n¯. Moreover, from
Eq. (13), the total number of modes needed is approxi-
mately N = 1/(n¯2).
For given values of n¯ and , we can simply compute the
value of D that leads to the largest difference between
the number of secret bits transmitted and the secret bits
consumed. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, where we plot
the net number of secret bits, i.e. the difference between
secret bits transmitted and secret bits consumed, that
can be produced per run of the protocol for different val-
ues of the noise level n¯ and the security level . From
Fig. 2, we learn that the ideal regime to conduct secret
key expansion corresponds to low noise levels and that a
significant price is paid for increasing security. Indeed,
under the assumptions used to derive Eq. (23), if we fix
D = α/n¯ for some α < 1, we can approximate the net
number of bits produced K as
K ≈ (1−α) log
(
1
n¯
)
+(2−α) log(α)−2 log
(
1

)
, (24)
showing how that the net number of secret bits produced
increases with small n¯ but decreases with small , in ac-
cordance with the exact calculations used for Fig. 2.
In conclusion, we have formally shown that covertness
also provides secrecy of the transmitted message, which
allows secret keys to be transmitted securely using covert
communication. We have also shown that in principle it
is possible to build covert communication protocols that
transmit more secret key than they consume, leading to
a novel method of key expansion that is also covert. In
a practical setting, transmission losses will make it very
challenging to transmit more secret bits than are con-
sumed, although it could potentially be achieved over
short distances using brighter coherent-state signals in-
stead of single photons and efficient detectors.
An alternative method for using covert communica-
tion for secret key expansion is to consider a computa-
tional security model where pseudorandom number gen-
erators (PRNGs) are used to decide in what blocks to
send the covert signals. This has the advantage that a
small amount of initial secret key can be used to covertly
transmit a much larger amount of new secret key. In the
next section, we discuss how composable security can also
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Number of secret bits covertly pro-
duced per run of the protocol, i.e. the difference between se-
cret bits transmitted and secret bits consumed, as a function
of the noise parameter n¯. The top curve (blue) corresponds to
a security level of  = 0.1, the middle curve (green) to  = 0.01
and the bottom curve (red) to  = 0.001. A negative value
implies that more secret bits are consumed than generated.
be obtained in this computational model and provide ex-
plicit protocols for secret key expansion.
III. KEY EXPANSION IN A COMPUTATIONAL
MODEL
Pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) are algo-
rithms that take a truly random bit string – referred to
as the seed – and output a much larger bit string. The
goal of a PRNG is to create an output that cannot be
distinguished from a truly random string by a computa-
tionally bounded adversary. Formally, let l be a polyno-
mial and let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l(n) be a PRNG mapping
seeds of n bits to pseudorandom strings of l(n) bits, with
l(n) > n. The pseudorandom function f is δ(n)-secure if
for any polynomial-time algorithm D it holds that [39]
|Pr[D(f(s)) = 1]− Pr[D(r) = 1]| ≤ δ(n), (25)
where r is a uniform random string of l(n) bits. The
probabilities are taken over a uniform choice of s, r and
any randomness in the algorithmD. It is usually required
that δ(n) is an exponentially small function of n. Note
that this definition is also composable as it is stated in
terms of distinguishing the output of a PRNG from the
ideal case of a truly random string.
In covert communication, instead of using a truly ran-
dom secret string to choose where to send signals, Alice
and Bob can instead use the key as the seed of a PRNG,
employing its pseudorandom output to decide where to
send the signals. This is in fact what is done in practice in
frequency-hopping and spread spectrum communications
[40]. In the following, we describe a secure key expansion
protocol in a computational model.
A. Protocol
1. Alice and Bob share an n-bit secret key k0 as well
as the pseudorandom output f(k0) produced from
a publicly known PRNG f with security δ(n).
2. Alice uniformly at random selects a new m-bit key
k1.
3. To transmit k1, she first uses an error-correcting
code E to produce a codeword E(k1) of the key.
She uses the pseudorandom output f(k0) to choose
the modes used to covertly transmit E(k1) to Bob.
4. Following transmission, Bob holds E(k1)
′, which
may not be identical to E(k1).
5. Bob performs error correction to recover k1.
If the covert communication protocol is -secure, this
implies, as discussed previously, that the transmitted se-
cret key is 2-secure with respect to secrecy from an ad-
versary – but only when true randomness is employed. If
a PRNG is used instead, then by definition a polynomial
adversary cannot distinguish the PRNG output from true
randomness except with probability δ(n), which is expo-
nentially small in n. From the union bound, this implies
that the detection bias of the covert protocol is at most
+ δ(n), leading to a 2(+ δ(n))-security of the new se-
cret key. Note that these statements are independent of
the particular covert communication protocol employed
as long as it is -secure.
This key expansion protocol can produce more secret
key than it consumes as long as m > n, i.e. as long
as the size of the transmitted message is larger than the
PRNG seed. Most of the widely used PRNGs such as
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and the Se-
cure Hashing Algorithm (SHA-3) have outputs that are
exponentially larger than their seeds while still retain-
ing computational indistinguishability from true random-
ness, which itself is exponentially small in the input seed.
This shows that a very large key can be expanded using
covert communication in a computational security model.
In this sense, covert communication can serve a similar
role as PRNG encryption, where security is obtained by
performing a modulo 2 sum of the message with a PRNG
output, as is commonly done with AES. In both cases,
a small secret key can be employed to protect a large
amount of communication, but in the case of covert com-
munication the transmission is also protected from detec-
tion by an adversary. These two methods could even be
combined for additional security by covertly transmitting
an encrypted key.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that it is in principle possible to per-
form secret key expansion using covert communication,
6even in the presence of unbounded quantum adversaries.
We have given conditions for when key expansion is pos-
sible, and shown that they can be met whenever the noise
level is sufficiently small for a given security level. From
a fundamental point of view, this is a novel method of
performing secure secret key expansion where noise is not
a hindrance but a vital resource. In practice, meeting the
required conditions for key expansion in the presence of
imperfections will be challenging, especially considering
the inherent low rates of covert communication. Hence
it is likely to be preferable to employ pseudorandomness
to determine in which modes the covert signals are sent.
Our results indicate that there is a vital benefit to covert
communication besides its direct goal of hiding commu-
nication from adversaries – it can also serve as a powerful
method for transmitting data requiring the highest levels
of security.
[1] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N. J. Cerf,
M. Dusˇek, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and M. Peev, Rev. Mod. Phys.
81, 1301 (2009).
[2] E. Diamanti, H.-K. Lo, B. Qi, and Z. Yuan, npj Quantum
Information 2, 16025 (2016).
[3] R. Amiri, P. Wallden, A. Kent, and E. Andersson, Phys-
ical Review A 93, 032325 (2016).
[4] J. M. Arrazola, P. Wallden, and E. Andersson, Quantum
Information and Computation 16, 0435 (2016).
[5] R. Amiri and E. Andersson, Entropy 17, 5635 (2015).
[6] R. J. Collins, R. Amiri, M. Fujiwara, T. Honjo,
K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, M. Takeoka, M. Sasaki, E. An-
dersson, and G. S. Buller, Scientific Reports 7 (2017).
[7] R. J. Collins, R. Amiri, M. Fujiwara, T. Honjo,
K. Shimizu, K. Tamaki, M. Takeoka, E. Andersson, G. S.
Buller, and M. Sasaki, Optics letters 41, 4883 (2016).
[8] H.-L. Yin, W.-L. Wang, Y.-L. Tang, Q. Zhao, H. Liu,
X.-X. Sun, W.-J. Zhang, H. Li, I. V. Puthoor, L.-X. You,
et al., Physical Review A 95, 042338 (2017).
[9] J. M. Arrazola and N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 89,
062305 (2014).
[10] F. Xu, J. M. Arrazola, K. Wei, W. Wang, P. Palacios-
Avila, C. Feng, S. Sajeed, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, and H.-K. Lo,
Nature Communications 6 (2015).
[11] J.-Y. Guan, F. Xu, H.-L. Yin, Y. Li, W.-J. Zhang, S.-J.
Chen, X.-Y. Yang, L. Li, L.-X. You, T.-Y. Chen, et al.,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 116, 240502 (2016).
[12] N. H. Y. Ng, S. K. Joshi, C. C. Ming, C. Kurtsiefer, and
S. Wehner, Nature Communications 3, 1326 (2012).
[13] T. Lunghi, J. Kaniewski, F. Bussie`res, R. Houlmann,
M. Tomamichel, A. Kent, N. Gisin, S. Wehner, and
H. Zbinden, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 180504 (2013).
[14] Y. Liu, Y. Cao, M. Curty, S.-K. Liao, J. Wang, K. Cui,
Y.-H. Li, Z.-H. Lin, Q.-C. Sun, D.-D. Li, et al., Physical
review letters 112, 010504 (2014).
[15] E. Verbanis, A. Martin, R. Houlmann, G. Boso,
F. Bussie`res, and H. Zbinden, Physical review letters
117, 140506 (2016).
[16] S. Wiesner, ACM Sigact News 15, 78 (1983).
[17] F. Pastawski, N. Y. Yao, L. Jiang, M. D. Lukin, and J. I.
Cirac, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
109, 16079 (2012).
[18] D. Gavinsky, in Computational Complexity (CCC), 2012
IEEE 27th Annual Conference (IEEE, 2012), pp. 42–52.
[19] M. Georgiou and I. Kerenidis, in LIPIcs-Leibniz Inter-
national Proceedings in Informatics (Schloss Dagstuhl-
Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2015), vol. 44.
[20] R. Amiri and J. M. Arrazola, Physical Review A 95,
062334 (2017).
[21] K. Bartkiewicz, A. Cˇernoch, G. Chimczak, K. Lemr,
A. Miranowicz, and F. Nori, npj Quantum Information
3, 7 (2017).
[22] M. Bozzio, A. Orieux, L. T. Vidarte, I. Za-
quine, I. Kerenidis, and E. Diamanti, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1705.01428 (2017).
[23] B. A. Bash, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, Selected Areas
in Communications, IEEE Journal on 31, 1921 (2013).
[24] B. A. Bash, S. Guha, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, Infor-
mation Theory Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE Interna-
tional Symposium on pp. 1715–1719 (2013).
[25] P. H. Che, M. Bakshi, and S. Jaggi, Information Theory
Proceedings (ISIT), 2013 IEEE International Symposium
on pp. 2945–2949 (2013).
[26] B. A. Bash, D. Goeckel, D. Towsley, and S. Guha, IEEE
Communications Magazine 53, 26 (2015).
[27] L. Wang, G. W. Wornell, and L. Zheng, IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory 62, 3493 (2016).
[28] A. Sheikholeslami, B. A. Bash, D. Towsley, D. Goeckel,
and S. Guha, in Information Theory (ISIT), 2016 IEEE
International Symposium on (IEEE, 2016), pp. 2064–
2068.
[29] K. S. K. Arumugam and M. R. Bloch, in 2016 IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)
(IEEE, 2016), pp. 2229–2233.
[30] M. R. Bloch, IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
62, 2334 (2016).
[31] B. A. Bash, D. Goeckel, and D. Towsley, IEEE Transac-
tions on Wireless Communications 15, 8394 (2016).
[32] L. Wang, in 2016 IEEE Information Theory Workshop
(ITW) (IEEE, 2016), pp. 364–368.
[33] B. A. Bash, A. H. Gheorghe, M. Patel, J. L. Habif,
D. Goeckel, D. Towsley, and S. Guha, Nature Communi-
cations 6 (2015).
[34] J. M. Arrazola and V. Scarani, Physical Review Letters
117, 250503 (2016).
[35] K. Bradler, T. Kalajdzievski, G. Siopsis, and C. Weed-
brook, arXiv preprint arXiv:1607.05916 (2016).
[36] K. Bradler, G. Siopsis, and A. Wozniakowski, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1704.07281 (2017).
[37] C. W. Helstrom, Academic Press (1976).
[38] C. Weidmann and G. Lechner, IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Theory 58, 6959 (2012).
[39] J. Katz and Y. Lindell, Introduction to modern cryptog-
raphy (CRC press, 2014).
[40] M. K. Simon, J. K. Omura, R. A. Scholtz, and B. K.
Levitt, Citeseer 2 (1994).
